Julia Gillard’s political woes shine the light on the failure of modern day spinners clinging desperately to a political communication technique invented for the 20th century model of mass media. In the 21st century, these techniques are proving increasingly out of date and so dangerously ineffective it could lose Labor an election when spin, ironically, should be key to winning elections…
Standard and well known spin techniques such as the ’seven second grab’, key messages, catchy slogans and carefully controlled media management have all backfired spectacularly for Ms Gillard. All of a sudden, these tricks look very dated prompting her to publicly reject this “very risk averse standard campaign model” and re-introduce herself as the “real Julia” in a desperate search for authenticity.
This move was a somewhat startling acknowledgment that the usual spin simply wasn’t ‘cutting through’. Techniques designed to win were, in fact, conspiring towards losing Labor the election.
Focus groups - unfairly dumping leaders for false infidelity?
So how is it the ALP’s crack campaign team, seasoned professionals whose job it is to know the business inside out, couldn’t predict that this ‘old spin’, on its own, wouldn’t work? They should have been even more aware of the dangers, given the current levels of cynicism around how Julia assumed office.
In fact, one almost wonders if there was even a communication strategy in place to deal with how the electorate may have responded to Rudd’s unprecedented and brutal assassination. Or was it so clever we almost missed it…?
Many people place the bulk of the blame for the campaign’s rocky ride at the feet of NSW Right leader Mark Arbib, who both secured and destroyed Rudd’s leadership. It is not only the role he is believed to have played in convincing Rudd to dump the ETS, a turning point for voters, but the risk averse, poll-centric, NSW Labor Right strategy, that he along with long term friend and campaign director Karl Bitar have continued to push as the best campaign model.
But it appears that the result has been panicky politics driven by focus group research, which has seen leaders dumped like 20-somethings dump lovers over false infidelities. Many argue their use of the focus group results is not accurate or effective.
Former staffer in the Carr and Iemma Governments, Mark Aarons, explains their technique involves targeting the least politically committed voters in marginal seats. Their theory is that “…these people determine who win government and their views should therefore predominate in policy-setting. In a bizarre reversal of conventional political wisdom, leadership is redefined as following such people by pandering to them.”
Aarons’ experience was that this strategy “led the (Iemma) government up a blind alley”, not reflecting mainstream voters who hated the policy idea” (in this instance the Kurnell desalination plant).
However, most say there is little wonder the Arbib-Bitar partnership believe in this model. Arguably it has won them office in NSW since 1995 and, maybe, even the Kevin 07 election. Why fix it if it ain’t broke? But election 2010 seems to have broken the mould. Time will ultimately tell.
Old spin doesn’t work for ‘real Julia’
These campaigns have been largely stage managed spin-fuelled fiestas, and none more than Kevin 07. And as Michael Gawenda points out in Business Spectator, Gillard 2010 is in many ways no more or no less stage managed than Kevin 07 was.
However, what is different is that she has only been PM for six weeks and the way in which Rudd was deposed. Going to the polls seems rushed…standard NSW campaigning?
What is interesting and maybe very clever spin, is this point made by Gawenda:
“Gillard had two major problems coming into this campaign: she had been involved in the assassination of Rudd and she was a woman. Gillard and her advisors, it seems, decided that any sign of aggression, of passion or even vision, would be turned against her - she would be seen as an angry, pitiless, female, political executioner. So for the first two weeks of the campaign she behaved as if she was on Prozac.”
So maybe this strategy was deliberate all along.
Play the standard orchestrated campaign cardboard cut-out; let it look like you are being played by the ‘faceless men’, because anything else would make you look like “an angry, pitiless, female, political executioner”.
And then announce the arrival of ‘real Julia’, who it now looks like has been brave enough to stand up to said men, and indulge the electorate with a soft, approachable and benevolent female leader.
Maybe sexist attitudes towards women in power have been grossly overlooked in how this campaign could and needed to be played.
It might actually be very clever indeed - an all together cleverer ‘new’ spin, a planned emergence of the real Julia as a natural evolution of the Gillard personality.
But then, the long term damage to the Labor party, brought about by the scary power of the faceless men, now emblazoned in the psyche of the electorate, still seems a high price to pay for this approach.
Using Julia Gillard and the current Federal Election as a case study, this is the first in a 4 part series examining whether spin techniques effectively developed for the 20th century media model are now outdated and ineffective in the 21st century. Post 2 looks at the ineffectiveness of ‘old spin’, the role of the media, and the trust deficit. Post 3 examines whether social media can help build trust and how the future of spinning lies in losing control. The final and fourth post will examine Ms Gillard’s apparent rejection of the “very risk averse standard campaign model” in the context of the election result.


























